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Finite-time Guarantees for Byzantine-Resilient Distributed
State Estimation with Noisy Measurements
Lili Su and Shahin Shahrampour
Abstract—This work considers resilient, cooperative state
estimation in unreliable multi-agent networks. A network
of agents aims to collaboratively estimate the value of an
unknown vector parameter, while an unknown subset of
agents suffer Byzantine faults. Faulty agents malfunction
arbitrarily and may send out highly unstructured messages
to other agents in the network. As opposed to fault-free
networks, reaching agreement in the presence of Byzantine
faults is far from trivial. In this paper, we propose a
computationally-efficient algorithm that is provably robust
to Byzantine faults. At each iteration of the algorithm, a
good agent (1) performs a gradient descent update based
on noisy local measurements, (2) exchanges its update with
other agents in its neighborhood, and (3) robustly aggre-
gates the received messages using coordinate-wise trimmed
means. Under mild technical assumptions, we establish that
good agents learn the true parameter asymptotically in
almost sure sense. We further complement our analysis
by proving (high probability) finite-time convergence rate,
encapsulating network characteristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collaborative state/parameter estimation has attracted
a considerable attention due to a wide range of appli-
cations in internet of things (IoT), wireless networks,
power grids, sensor networks, and robotic networks [1]–
[7]. In these applications, a network of (connected)
agents collect information in a distributed fashion and
share an overarching goal to learn the common unknown
truth θ∗ ∈ Rd. Local measurements obtained by each
individual agent contain noisy and highly incomplete in-
formation about θ∗. Nevertheless, the network of agents
might be able to collaboratively learn θ∗ by effectively
fusing the information contained in their local measure-
ments.
In the absence of system adversary, the state estima-
tion problem is well-studied [5], [8]. However, some
practical scenarios such as IoT, micro-grids, and Fed-
erated Learning are vulnerable to faults [9]. Motivated
by that, we are interested in addressing collaborative
estimation in the presence of malicious agents. The
existence of malicious agents might arise when some of
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the networked agents are compromised by a system ad-
versary. Despite the wealth of literature on collaborative
estimation with random link failures, packet-dropping
failures, and crash failures (e.g. [10]), perhaps less well-
known is estimation in the presence of highly unstruc-
tured failures or even adversarial agents, especially in
finite-time domain.
In this work, to formally capture the unstructured
system threat, we adopt Byzantine fault model [11] –
a canonical fault model in distributed computing. In
this model, there exists a system adversary that can
choose up to a constant fraction of agents to compromise
and control. An agent suffering Byzantine fault behaves
arbitrarily badly by sending out unstructured malicious
messages to the good agents. In addition, Byzantine
agents may give conflicting messages to different agents
in the system. Tolerating Byzantine faults is highly non-
trivial (see e.g. [12], [13]). For example, it is well-
known that in complete graphs, no algorithm can tolerate
more than 1/3 of the agents to be Byzantine [13]. This
difficulty arises partially from the system asymmetry
caused by the conflicting messages sent by the Byzantine
agents. In fact, Byzantine consensus with vector multi-
dimensional inputs in the complete graphs had not been
solved until only recently [14], [15].
Despite intensive efforts on securing distributed learn-
ing (see Section I-B for details), to the best of the
authors’ knowledge, efficient algorithms that are prov-
ably resilient to Byzantine faults with less stringent as-
sumptions on noisy local measurements are still lacking.
In particular, the literature has mostly focused on the
asymptotic analysis, leaving the finite-time guarantees
for such algorithms a complementary direction to pursue,
which is the main focal point of this work.
A. Our Contributions
We propose a computationally-efficient algorithm that
is provably robust to Byzantine faults. At each iteration
of our algorithm, a good agent (1) performs a gradient
descent update based on local measurements only, (2)
exchanges its update with other agents in its neighbor-
hood, and (3) robustly aggregates the received messages
using coordinate-wise trimmed means.
For ease of exposition, we first present our results
for fully connected networks (complete graphs), and
then generalize the obtained results to general networks
(incomplete graphs) assuming that the networks satisfy
the necessary conditions such that Byzantine-resilient
consensus with scalar inputs can be achievable. For both
cases, we establish that every good agent learns the true
parameter asymptotically in the almost sure sense. Most
importantly, we characterize the finite-time convergence
rate (in high-probability sense), encapsulating network
characteristics. We finally provide numerical simulations
for our method to verify our theoretical results.
B. Related Literature
Resilient estimation, detection, and learning has at-
tracted a great deal of attention in the past few years,
and many researchers in the fields of control, signal
processing, and network science have addressed the
problem by adopting different notions of resilience or
robustness.
In [16]–[18], resilience has been discussed in the
context of smart power grid systems using cardinality
minimization and its ℓ1 relaxations. On the other hand,
the focus of [19], [20] is on estimation in Linear Time-
Invariant (LTI) systems. In [19], an interesting approach
is proposed for fault detection using monitors, and
fundamental monitoring limitations have been charac-
terized using tools from system theory and game theory.
Furthermore, the approach of [20] is inspired from the
areas of error-correction over the reals and compressed
sensing. In [21], robust Kalman filtering is discussed,
where the estimate updates are derived using a convex ℓ1
optimization problem. Authors of [22] consider a model
where the observation noise is sparse, in the sense that
the faulty sensors have noisy measurements, while other
sensors measurements are noiseless. An event triggered
projected gradient descent is then proposed to reconstruct
the state. In our setting, though the state is fixed, we
deal with multi-agent networks, i.e., the problem must
be solved in a distributed manner since each agent has
local (noisy) measurements from the state, and message
passing schemes (e.g. consensus) are required to learn
the state.
In parallel to advancements on resilient centralized
estimation, recent years have witnessed intensive interest
in securing distributed estimation. The authors of [23]
discuss reaching consensus in the presence of malicious
agents, assuming a broadcast model of communication.
Chen et al. [24] propose a novel adversary detection
strategy under which good agents either asymptotically
learn the true state or detect the existence of a system
fault. If a fault is flagged, the system goes through
some external procedure to “repair” itself. As a result,
the method does not perform estimation under system
adversary (which is the focus of this paper). Furthermore,
other resilient algorithms have been proposed [25]–[29]
with different assumptions and performance guarantees.
Chen et al. [25] propose an algorithm under which all of
the agents’ estimates converge to the true state as long as
less than one half of the agents are faulty. However, this
algorithm works under the assumption that an agent can
fully observe the true state in the non-faulty condition
[25, Section II.A], as opposed to our model which deals
with both observability and noisy measurement issues.
Mitra and Sundaram [26] consider the more general
LTI systems and characterize the fundamental limits
on adversary-resilient algorithms. However, unlike our
work, [26] deals with noiseless observations and the
focus is on asymptotic analysis. Xu et al. [27] study
the general dynamic optimization problem. They propose
a total variation (TV) norm regularization technique to
mitigate the effect of malfunctioning agents, but unfor-
tunately, in the static case, the good agents cannot learn
the true minimizer (see Corollary 1 in [27]). In fact,
[27, Assumption 4] might not hold in the sense that
under some strategies of the adversary agents, some good
agents may appear to be bad to others, and the outgoing
links from those agents might be cut off by the good
agents. The lack of convergence in this case is consistent
with the lower bound result in [30].
Another relevant work is the distributed hypothesis
testing of [28] where the algorithm Byz-Iter is proposed.
Though this algorithm may work for the state estimation
problem, it scales poorly in dimension. Our algorithm is
similar to [29] in that we both combine local gradient de-
scent with coordinate-wise message trimming. Although
[29] considers a more general optimization framework, it
is implicitly assumed that the optimization problem can
be separated into independent optimization problems (of
the size of unknown parameter); otherwise, [29, Lemma
1] does not hold and the proof in [30] cannot be applied.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Model
We consider a multi-agent network which is a col-
lection of n agents/nodes communicating with each
other through a communication network G(V , E), where
V = {1, · · · , n} and E denote the set of nodes and
edges, respectively. We denote by Ni the set of incoming
neighbors of agent i. An unknown subset of agents
of size at most b, denoted by A, might be bad or
adversarial. The setA is chosen by the system adversary.
For ease of exposition, let
|V/A| = φ.
Clearly, φ ≥ n− b.
Good agents (agents in V/A) aim to estimate the un-
known parameter collaboratively, but bad agents (agents
in A) can adversarially affect the estimation procedure
by sending completely arbitrary, malicious, and possibly
conflicting messages to the good agents.
B. Observation Model
In this work, we focus on a linear observation model,
where yi(t) represents the local measurement of agent i
at time t as follows
yi(t) = Hiθ
∗ + wi(t), (1)
and Hi ∈ Rni×d is the local observation matrix. The
noise sequence wi(t) is i.i.d. with E [wi(t)] = 0 and
E
[
wi(t)wi(t)
⊤
]
= Σi. The sequences are bounded
for all agents, i.e., there exists constant C > 0 such
that P {‖wi(t)‖2 ≤ C} = 1 for i ∈ V . Moreover, the
noise sequences across good agents are independent.
That is, (wi(t), t ≥ 1) and (wj(t), t ≥ 1) for i 6= j are
independent. As in practice the observation matrix Hi
is often fat, i.e., ni ≪ d, each agent i must obtain
information from others to correctly estimate θ∗.
C. Fault Model
To formally capture the system threat, we adopt the
Byzantine fault model [11] – a canonical fault model
in distributed computing. In this model, there exists
a system adversary that can choose up to b of the
n agents (where b < n) to compromise and control.
Recall that this set of agents is denoted by A. An agent
suffering Byzantine fault is referred to as Byzantine
agent. While the set A is unknown to good agents, a
standard assumption in the literature is that the value of
b is common knowledge [11].
The system adversary is extremely powerful in the
sense that it has complete knowledge of the network,
including the local program that each good agent is
supposed to run, the true value of the parameter θ∗,
the current status and running history of the multi-agent
network system, the running history, etc. Hence, the
Byzantine agents can collude with each other and deviate
from their pre-specified local programs to arbitrarily
misrepresent information to the good agents. In particu-
lar, Byzantine agents can mislead each of the good agents
in a unique fashion, i.e., letting mij(t) ∈ Rd be the
message sent from agent i ∈ A to agent j ∈ V\A at time
t, it is possible that mij(t) 6= mij′ (t) for j 6= j′ ∈ V\A.
Remark 1. Note that due to the extreme freedom given
to Byzantine agents and the system asymmetry caused
by them, a resilient distributed solution to the estimation
problem is highly non-trivial even in complete graphs.
In particular, it is well-known that in complete graphs,
no algorithm can tolerate more than 1/3 of the agents
to be Byzantine [13].
D. Finite-time vs. Asymptotic Local Functions
The Byzantine-resilient state estimation problem can
be viewed with an optimization lens, where each good
agent would only asymptotically know its local function.
For each agent i ∈ V , define the asymptotic local
function fi : R
d → R as
fi(x) , E
[
1
2
‖Hix− yi‖22
]
, (2)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of
wi. Note that fi is well-defined for each i ∈ V regardless
of whether it is suffering Byzantine faults or not. Since
the distribution of wi is unknown to agent i, at any
finite t, function fi is not accessible to agent i. However,
the agent has access to the finite-time or empirical local
function
fi,t(x) ,
1
t
t∑
s=1
1
2
‖Hix− yi(s)‖22 , (3)
whose gradient at x is
∇fi,t(x) = H⊤i Hi (x− θ∗)−H⊤i
1
t
t∑
r=1
wi(t). (4)
III. BYZANTINE-RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATION
To robustify distributed state estimation against
Byzantine faults, one approach may be to combine the
local gradient descent with multi-dimensional Byzantine-
resilient consensus [14], [15], [28] (which typically relies
on using Tverberg points). However, the performance
of any such algorithm is proved to scale poorly in the
dimension of the parameter d [14], [15], [28]. This is
partially due to the fact that different dimensions of
the inputs strongly interfere with each other, and the
Byzantine agents can inject wrong information with both
extreme magnitudes and directions.
To improve the scalability with respect to d and to
improve the computation complexity, instead of multi-
dimensional Byzantine-resilient consensus, we robustly
aggregate the received messages using coordinate-wise
trimmed means.
A. Algorithm
We propose an algorithm, named Byzantine-resilient
state estimation, where each good agent iteratively ag-
gregates the received messages. To robustify, the agent
discards the largest b and the smallest b values for each
component. In particular, in each iteration, an agent
performs the following three steps:
• Local gradient descent: Agent i first computes the
noisy local gradient ∇fi,t(xi(t− 1)), and performs
local gradient descent to obtain zi(t), i.e.,
zi(t) = xi(t− 1)−∇fi,t(xi(t− 1)).
Note that the step-size used in this update is 1.
• Information exchange: It exchanges zi(t) with
other agents in its local neighborhood. Recall that
mij(t) ∈ Rd is the message sent from agent i to
agent j at time t. It relates to zi(t) as follows:
mij(t) =
{
zi(t) if i ∈ (V/A);
⋆ if i ∈ A,
where ⋆ denotes an arbitrary value. Byzantine
agents can mislead good agents differently, i.e., if
i ∈ A, it might hold that mij(t) 6= mij′ (t) for
j 6= j′ ∈ V \ A.
• Robust aggregation: For each component k =
1, . . . , d, the agent computes the trimmed mean and
uses them to obtain xi(t).
The formal description of the algorithm for agent i ∈
V \ A is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Byzantine-resilient state estimation
Input: b and T
Initialization: Set xi(0) to an arbitrary value for
each agent i ∈ V
for t = 1, . . . , T do
- Obtain a new measurement yi(t);
- Compute the local noisy gradient
∇fi,t(xi(t− 1)) according to (4);
- Compute zi(t) = xi(t− 1)−∇fi,t(xi(t− 1));
- Send zi(t) to its outgoing neighbors;
for k = 1, . . . , d do
- Sort the k–th component of the received
messages mji(t) for j ∈ Ni ∪ {i} in a
non-decreasing (increasing) order;
- Remove the largest b values and the
smallest b values;
- Denote the remained “agent” indices set
as Rki (t) and set
xki (t) =
1∣∣Rki (t)∣∣
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈mji(t), ek〉 .
end
- Set (xi(t))
⊤ =
(
x1i (t), . . . , x
d
i (t)
)
.
end
Output: xi(T ).
IV. FINITE-TIME GUARANTEE FOR COMPLETE
NETWORKS
In this section, we provide results for the case that
G(V , E) is a complete graph. Beside the fact that the
technical analysis of complete graphs would be dif-
ferent from that of incomplete graphs (in terms of
assumptions), the former is particularity interesting in
computer networks. In fact, in many computer networks
efficient communication protocols (such as TCP/IP) can
be implemented such that any two computer are logically
connected.
It can be shown that the update of xi uses the informa-
tion provided by the good agents only. In addition, each
of the good agent has limited impact on xi, formally
stated next.
Lemma 1. For each iteration t, each good agent
i ∈ V/A, and each k, there exist coefficients(
βkij(t), j ∈ V/A
)
such that
• xki (t) =
∑
j∈V/A β
k
ij(t) 〈zj(t), ek〉;
• 0 ≤ βkij(t) ≤ 1φ−b for all j ∈ V/A and∑
j∈V/A β
k
ij(t) = 1.
Notice that the sets of convex coefficients for different
values of k might be different, i.e.,
(
βkij(t), j ∈ V/A
) 6=(
βk
′
ij (t), j ∈ V/A
)
for k 6= k′. Moreover, even for
the same k, the convex coefficients might be different
for different good agents, i.e.,
(
βkij(t), j ∈ V/A
) 6=(
βki′j(t), j ∈ V/A
)
for i 6= i′. This stems from the free-
dom of Byzantine agents in sending different messages
across agents, i.e., maj 6= maj′ if a ∈ A and j 6= j′.
To prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, we use the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all k = 1, · · · , d, we have that
1
φ− b
∑
j∈V/A
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 < 1.
Note that
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 is the ℓ1 norm of the
k–th column of matrix I − H⊤j Hj . It can well be
the case that
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ≥ 1 for some good
agents. However, Assumption 1 implies that for each
k = 1, · · · , d, there exists at least b + 1 good agents
such that ∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 < 1.
The above assumption is imposed for the d compo-
nents individually. None of the agents are required to
satisfy
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 < 1 simultaneously for all
k = 1, · · · , d. Now, let
ρ , max
k:1≤k≤d
∑
j∈V/A
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1
φ− b . (5)
Clearly, ρ < 1 under Assumption 1. For ease of exposi-
tion, for each j ∈ V/A and for any λ ∈ (0, 1), let
Rj(λ, t) ,
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥
∑t−m
r=1 wj(r)
t−m
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (6)
The following two concentration results are two key
auxiliary lemmas for our main theorem.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for each
j ∈ V/A and for any λ ∈ (0, 1)
lim
t→∞
Rj(λ, t) = 0 almost surely.
In addition, we characterize the finite-time conver-
gence rate of Rj(λ, ·) for any fixed λ.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for each
j ∈ V/A and for any λ ∈ (0, 1)
P
{
Rj(λ, t) ≥
√
trace(Σj)
t−1∑
m=1
λm
1√
t−m + ǫ
}
≤ exp
(−ǫ2(1− λ)2t
8C2
)
,
Lemma 3 implies that ∀j ∈ V/A, with probability at
least 1− δ, Rj(t) = O
(√(
log 1δ
)
/t
)
.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the graph
G(V , E) is complete. Then
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t)− θ∗‖∞ a.s.−−→ 0.
Moreover, with probability at least
1− φ exp
(
−ǫ2(1−ρ)2t
8C2
)
, it holds that
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t)− θ∗‖∞ ≤ ρt max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞
+ C0
 ∑
i∈V/A
√
trace(Σj)
 t−1∑
m=1
ρm√
t−m + φǫ,
where C0 , maxi∈V/A ‖Hi‖2.
The theorem indicates that all good agents (in a
complete graph) are eventually able to learn the true
parameter θ∗ almost surely. Also, with high probability
the rate can be characterized as above, providing a finite-
time guarantee for resilient estimation. The finite-time
bound captures the performance, in terms of Σj , the
noise covariance for agent j ∈ V/A, as well as ρ, which
can crudely serve as a measure of observability in view
of (5).
V. FINITE-TIME GUARANTEES FOR INCOMPLETE
NETWORKS
A. Incomplete Graphs: Multihop Communication
So far, our analysis of Algorithm 1 has focused on
complete graphs.
For computer networks, this is a reasonable assump-
tion as computers are connected to each other through
some communication (routing) protocols. Our results
are also applicable to wireless networks under some
implementation assumptions.
Concretely, let G(V , E) be the physical network that
is not fully connected. Suppose the networked agents
are allowed to relay the messages sent by others such
that multi-hop communication can be implemented. We
can adopt coding to force the Byzantine agents to
either refuse to relay information or faithfully relay the
messages without alternation [12]. Thus, as long as the
node-connectively of G(V , E) is at least b+1, each good
agent can reliably receive messages from other good
agents in the network. We can use our algorithm to robust
aggregate the received messages and perform one-step
update. Similar analysis applies.
B. Incomplete Graphs: Local Communication
Message forwarding might be costly or even infea-
sible for some wireless networks. Algorithms that rely
solely on local communication are still highly desirable.
Fortunately, with reasonable assumptions, Algorithm 1
works. Our algorithm is a consensus-based algorithm,
so to make the paper self-contained, we briefly review
relevant existing results on Byzantine consensus.
1) Byzantine Consensus with Scalar Inputs: Note
that, in contrast to fault-free consensus, Byzantine-
resilient consensus with scalar inputs and with mul-
tidimensional inputs are fundamentally different [14],
[15], [31]. Our algorithm relies on Byzantine-resilient
consensus with scalar inputs.
Tight topological conditions are characterized in [31],
where the conditions are stated in terms of a family
of subgraphs of G(V , E). Those subgraphs capture the
“real” information flow under the message trimming
strategy. Informally speaking, trimming certain messages
can be viewed as ignoring (or removing) incoming
links that carry the outliers. The non-uniqueness of the
subgraph arises partially from the fact that the Byzan-
tine agents can behave adaptively and arbitrarily. Such
subgraphs are referred to as reduced graphs, defined as
follows.
Definition 1. [31] A reduced graph H of G(V , E) is
obtained by (i) removing all faulty nodes A, and all
the links incident on the faulty nodes A; and (ii) for
each non-faulty node (nodes in V/A), removing up to b
additional incoming links.
It is important to note that the non-faulty agents do
not know the identities of the faulty agents. Let H be
the collection of all reduced graphs of G(V , E), and let
ξ := |H| .
Definition 2. A source component in a given reduced
graph is a strongly connected component, which does not
have any incoming links from outside of that component.
It turns out that the effective communication net-
work is potentially time-varying (partly) due to time-
varying behaviors of Byzantine agents. The tight network
topology condition for scaler valued consensus to be
achievable is characterized in [31].
Theorem 2. [31] For scalar inputs, iterative approx-
imate Byzantine consensus is achievable among non-
faulty agents if and only if every reduced graph of
G(V , E) contains only one source component.
Under the condition in Theorem 2, it follows that in
any reduced graph, a node in the source component can
reach every other nodes.
2) Correctness of Algorithm 1 for Incomplete Graphs:
We will show the correctness of our Algorithm 1 as-
suming that Byzantine consensus with scalar inputs is
achievable over G(V , E), and the following assumption
holds.
Assumption 2. For each non-faulty node j ∈ V/A and
each k = 1, · · · , d,∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ≤ 1.
In addition, any reduced graph H contains a node in its
unique source component such that for all k = 1, · · · , d,∣∣∣(Ni ∪ {i}/A) ∩ {j : ∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 < 1}∣∣∣ ≥ b+ 1.
Note that in Assumption 2, Ni is the incoming neigh-
bors of node i in the original graph G(V , E).
Define ρ0 as
ρ0 := max
1≤k≤d
max
j:‖(I−H⊤j Hj)ek‖1<1
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 .
(7)
In (7), the maximization
max
j:‖(I−H⊤j Hj)ek‖1<1
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1
is taken over the non-faulty nodes only.
Similar to the analysis for the complete graphs, it can
be shown that the update of xi uses the information
provided by its good neighbors only.
Lemma 4. [32, Claim 2] For each iteration t, each
good agent i ∈ V/A, and each k, there exist coefficients(
βkij(t), j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}
)
such that
• xki (t) =
∑
j∈Ni∪{i}/A
βkij(t) 〈zj(t), ek〉;
• There exists a subset of Bi(t) ⊆ Ni ∪ {i}/A such
that |B(t)| ≥ |Ni ∪ {i}/A| − b and βkij(t) ≥
1
2(|Ni∪{i}/A|−b)
for each j ∈ Bi(t).
In the next theorem, we establish that (under the
assumption above) the estimates of all agents are consis-
tent almost surely, and furthermore, we characterize the
(high probability) finite-time convergence rate of these
estimates.
Theorem 3. Suppose that every reduced graph of
G(V , E) contains a single source component, and As-
sumption 2 holds. Then
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t)− θ∗‖∞ a.s.−−→ 0.
Let γ := 1− 1−ρ0
(2(φ−b))ξφ
. With probability at least
1− φ exp
(
−ǫ2(1−γ
1
ξφ )2t
8C2
)
, it holds that
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t)− θ∗‖∞ ≤ γ
t
ξφ max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞
+ C0
 ∑
i∈V/A
√
trace(Σj)
 t−1∑
m=1
γ
m
ξφ√
t−m + φǫ.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We now provide empirical evidence in support of our
algorithm. We consider a complete graph of |V \A| = 30
agents. Each component of the unknown parameter θ∗ ∈
R
50 is generated randomly within the interval [−1, 1]
and is fixed thereafter during the estimation process.
Moreover, the observation matrices Hi ∈ R20×50 for
each i are chosen such that Assumption 1 holds.
Evidently, in this example, ni = 20 for all i.
Throughout, the adversarial agents can send out com-
pletely arbitrary messages in lieu of true gradients. We
generate these arbitrary messages using a random 50-
dimensional vector, each component of which is sampled
from N (0, 9).
Let us now define the network performance metric as
Error(t) ,
1
φ
∑
i∈V\A
‖θ∗ − xi(t)‖
and plot in Fig. 1 the error for various values of
adversarial agents |A| ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 10}. We observe a
dichotomy, where for |A| < 7 the error converges to
zero, whereas for |A| ≥ 7 the convergence does not
occur. Moreover, increase in the number of adversarial
agents degrades the performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied resilient distributed estimation, where a
network of agents want to learn the value of an unknown
parameter in the presence of Byzantine agents. The main
challenges in the problem are as follows: (i) Byzantine
agents send out arbitrary messages to other agents, (ii)
good agents need to deal with noisy measurements,
and (iii) the parameter is not locally observable. We
proposed an algorithm that allows agents to collectively
learn the true parameter asymptotically in almost sure
sense, and we further complemented our results with
finite-time analysis. Future directions include resilient
estimation and learning in a more general setting, where
0 50 100 150 200
t
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Er
ro
r
4 Adversarial Agents
5 Adversarial Agents
6 Adversarial Agents
7 Adversarial Agents
8 Adversarial Agents
9 Adversarial Agents
10 Adversarial Agents
Fig. 1: The plot of error decay versus time for different
number of adversarial agents.
agents observations can be a nonlinear function of the
unknown parameter. Another interesting direction is to
investigate the minimal condition needed on the local
observation matrices of the good agents for the problem
to be solvable.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove this lemma by construction. Note that this
construction is only used in the algorithm analysis rather
than an algorithm input. That is, to run the algorithm,
each agent (either good or faulty) does not need to know
β.
For ease of exposition, let [Rki (t)]+ and [Rki (t)]− be
the non-overlapping subsets of V whose gradient’s k–th
entry are trimmed away by agent i. Precisely,
(a)
∣∣[Rki (t)]−∣∣ = b = ∣∣[Rki (t)]+∣∣;
(b) [Rki (t)]−, [Rki (t)]+ and Rki (t) partition set V ;
(c) ∀ j′ ∈ [Rki (t)]−, j ∈ Rki (t), and j′′ ∈ [Rki (t)]+ it
holds that
〈mj′i(t), ek〉 ≤ 〈mji(t), ek〉 ≤ 〈mj′′i(t), ek〉 . (8)
We consider two cases: (1) Rki (t) ∩ A = ∅; and (2)
Rki (t) ∩ A 6= ∅.
Case 1: Suppose that Rki (t) ∩A = ∅. We construct the
convex coefficients as follows:
Case 1-1: When |A| = b, we have φ− b = n− 2b. We
choose the convex coefficients as
βkij(t) =
{
1
n−2b , ∀j ∈ Rki (t), and
0, ∀j /∈ Rki (t).
Clearly, in this construction, βkij(t) ≤ 1φ−b .
Case 1-2: When |A| < b, it holds that∣∣[Rki (t)]−/A∣∣ ≥ b− |A|, (9)
and ∣∣[Rki (t)]+/A∣∣ ≥ b− |A|. (10)
By (8), we have
1∣∣[Rki (t)]−/A∣∣
∑
j∈[Rk
i
(t)]−/A
〈zj(t), ek〉
≤ 1
n− 2b
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
≤ 1∣∣[Rki (t)]+/A∣∣
∑
j∈[Rki (t)]
+/A
〈zj(t), ek〉 .
Thus, there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that
1
n− 2b
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
=
α∣∣[Rki (t)]−/A∣∣
∑
j∈[Rk
i
(t)]−/A
〈zj(t), ek〉
+
1− α∣∣[Rki (t)]+/A∣∣
∑
j∈[Rki (t)]
+/A
〈zj(t), ek〉 . (11)
Note that
1
n− 2b
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
=
1
φ− b
(
1 +
f − |A|
n− 2b
) ∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
=
1
φ− b
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
+
1
φ− b
b− |A|
n− 2b
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
(a)
=
1
φ− b
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈zj(t), ek〉
+
α(b− |A|)
(φ − b) ∣∣[Rki (t)]−/A∣∣
∑
j∈[Rk
i
(t)]−/A
〈zj(t), ek〉
+
(1 − α)(b − |A|)
(φ − b) ∣∣[Rki (t)]+/A∣∣
∑
j∈[Rk
i
(t)]+/A
〈zj(t), ek〉 .
where equality (a) follows from (11). Choose the convex
coefficients for the good agents as follows:
βkij(t) =

1
φ−b , ∀j ∈ Rki (t),
α(b−|A|)
(φ−b)|[Rki (t)]−/A| ∀j ∈ [R
k
i (t)]
−/A,
(1−α)(b−|A|)
(φ−b)|[Rki (t)]+/A| ∀j ∈ [R
k
i (t)]
+/A.
The fact that α is unknown does not affect our correct-
ness proof – as our algorithm not use these coefficients
as input. We use the existence of α for analysis. It is
easy to see that the above coefficients are valid convex
coefficients. It remains to check that βkij(t) ≤ 1φ−b for all
j ∈ V/A. For all good in Rki (t), clearly βkij(t) ≤ 1φ−b .
For j ∈ [Rki (t)]−/A, by (10) and the fact that α ≤ 1,
we have
βkij(t) ≤
α(b− |A|)
(φ− b)(b− |A|) ≤
1
φ− b ,
Similarly, we can show βkij(t) ≤ 1φ−b for j ∈
[Rki (t)]+/A.
Case 2 can be proved similarly.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let ω be any sample path such that
limt→∞
1
t
∑t
r=1 wj(r, ω) = 0. Note that fixing ω,
wj(t, ω) for t = 1, · · · is a standard sequence of
vectors. We will show that
lim
t→∞
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥
∑t−m
r=1 wj(r, ω)
t−m
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 0. (12)
By Strong Law of Large Number we know that
P
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
r=1
wj(r, ω) = 0
}
= 1.
Thus, if (12) holds, then
P
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
t→∞
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥
∑t−m
r=1 wj(r, ω)
t−m
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 0
}
= 1,
proving the lemma.
Next we show (12). It is enough to show that for any
ǫ > 0, there exists t ≥ t(ǫ, ω) such that
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ǫ. (13)
Since limt→∞
1
t
∑t
r=1 wj(r, ω) = 0, for any
(1−λ)ǫ
2 ,
there exists t0(ǫ, ω) such that for any t ≥ t0(ǫ, ω),∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ (1− λ)ǫ
2
.
In addition, for any t ≥ t0(ǫ, ω), it holds that
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥
∑t−m
r=1 wj(r)
t−m
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
t−t0(ǫ,ω)∑
m=0
λm
(1 − λ)ǫ
2
+ C
t−1∑
m=t−t0(ǫ,ω)+1
λm
≤ ǫ
2
+ C
λt−t0(ǫ,ω)+1
1− λ .
There exists a sufficiently large t(ǫ, ω) such that
C λ
t−t0(ǫ,ω)+1
1−λ ≤ ǫ2 . Thus, it holds that for this fixed
sample path ω, for any ǫ > 0, there exists t(ǫ, ω) such
that for all t ≥ t(ǫ, ω)
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ,
proving (13).
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Our proof uses the McDiarmid’s inequality.
We first bound the expectation of Rj(λ, t).
E [Rj(λ, t)] =
t−1∑
m=0
λmE
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
]
(a)
≤
t−1∑
m=0
λm
√√√√√E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2

where equality (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Recall that wj(r) for r = 1, · · · , t−m are independent
and E [wj(r)] = 0 for each r = 1, · · · , t−m. Thus, for
any j ∈ V/A, we have
E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
 = 1
t−m trace (Σj) .
So we get
E [Rj(λ, t)] ≤
√
trace (Σj)
t−1∑
m=1
λm
1√
t−m.
We choose h as
h({wj(r)}tr=1) ,
t−1∑
m=0
λm
∥∥∥∥∥
∑t−m
r=1 wj(r)
t−m
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
It can be shown that we can choose cr to be
cr = C
t−r∑
m=0
λm
1
t−m, ∀r = 1, · · · , t.
Let m0 =
log λt2
log 1
λ
. It is easy to see that m0 ≤ t2 unless t
is extremely small. For simplicity, assume that
log λt2
log 1
λ
is
an integer. So we have
c1 = C
(
m0∑
m=0
λm
1
t−m +
t−1∑
m0+1
λm
1
t−m
)
≤ 4C
(1− λ)t .
It is easy to see that cr ≤ c1 for all r = 1, · · · , t. So we
have
t∑
r=1
c2r ≤ tc21 ≤
(
4C
1− λ
)2
1
t
.
By McDiarmid’s Inequality we have
P
{
Rj(λ, t) ≥
√
trace(Σj)
t−1∑
m=1
λm
1√
t−m + ǫ
}
≤ exp
(
−2ǫ2∑t
r=1 c
2
r
)
≤ exp
(−ǫ2(1− λ)2t
8C2
)
.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For each t, xi(t) can be uniquely rewritten as
xi(t) = θ
∗ +
d∑
k=1
αki (t)ek,
where αki (t), k = 1, · · · , d is a linear coefficients. At
time t, for each k = 1, · · · , d, it holds that
αki (t) =
1∣∣Rki (t)∣∣
∑
j∈Rk
i
(t)
〈mji(t), ek〉 − 〈θ∗, ek〉 .
It follows from Lemma 1 that
αki (t) =
∑
j∈V/A
βkij(t) 〈zj(t), ek〉 − 〈θ∗, ek〉 . (14)
Recall from (3) and (4), for each k = 1, · · · , d, we have
〈zi(t), ek〉 = 〈θ∗, ek〉+
〈
H⊤i
1
t
t∑
r=1
wi(r), ek
〉
+
〈
d∑
k′=1
αk
′
i (t− 1)
(
I−H⊤i Hi
)
ek′ , ek
〉
.
Thus, (14) becomes
αki (t) =
∑
j∈V/A
βkij(t)
〈
H⊤j
1
t
t∑
r=1
wj(r), ek
〉
+
∑
j∈V/A
βkij(t)
〈
d∑
k′=1
αk
′
j (t− 1)
(
I−H⊤j Hj
)
ek′ , ek
〉
.
By Lemma 1, we have
∣∣αki (t)∣∣ ≤
∑
j∈V/A
∣∣∣〈H⊤j 1t ∑tr=1wj(r), ek〉∣∣∣
φ− b
+
∑
j∈V/A
∣∣∣〈∑dk′=1 αk′j (t− 1) (I−H⊤j Hj) ek′ , ek〉∣∣∣
φ− b .
For the second term, we have∣∣∣∣∣
〈
d∑
k′=1
αk
′
j (t− 1)
(
I−H⊤j Hj
)
ek′ , ek
〉∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
max
j∈V/A
max
1≤k′≤d
∣∣∣αk′j (t− 1)∣∣∣)∥∥e⊤k (I−H⊤j Hj)∥∥1
=
(
max
j∈V/A
‖xj(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞
)∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ,
where the last equality follows from the fact that(
I−H⊤j Hj
)
is symmetric. For the first term, we have
max
1≤k≤d
∣∣∣∣∣
〈
H⊤j
1
t
t∑
r=1
wj(r), ek
〉∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥H⊤j 1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ C0
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
By Assumption 1, we have
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t)− θ∗‖∞
≤ ρ max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞ + max
i∈V/A
C0
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wi(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ρ max
i∈V/A
‖xi(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞ +
∑
i∈V/A
C0
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wi(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ρt max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞ + C0
∑
j∈V/A
Rj(ρ, t).
By Lemmas 2 and 3 with λ = ρ, we complete the proof.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first show that the evolution of ‖xi(t) − θ∗‖∞ –
the ℓ∞ norm of the estimation errors – for all i ∈ V/A
collectively have a matrix representation. Then we
bound the convergence rate of the obtained matrix
product.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, for any i ∈ V/A
and any k, we have
|αki (t)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
〈
H⊤j
1
t
t∑
r=1
wj(r), ek
〉∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
〈(
I−H⊤j Hj
)
I
(
d∑
k′=1
αk
′
j (t− 1)ek′
)
, ek
〉∣∣∣∣∣ .
For the second term, we have∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
〈(
I−H⊤j Hj
)( d∑
k′=1
αk
′
j (t− 1)ek′
)
, ek
〉∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ‖xj(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞ .
For the first term, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
〈
H⊤j
1
t
t∑
r=1
wj(r), ek
〉∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ C0 max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Thus, we get
‖xi(t)− θ∗‖∞ = max1≤k≤d |α
k
i (t)|
≤ max
1≤k≤d
∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ‖xj(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞
+ C0 max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Let E(t) ∈ Rφ be the vector that stacks the ℓ∞ norm of
the errors xi(t)−θ∗ for all i ∈ V/A. For each i ∈ V/A,
define matrix M(t) as follows:
Mi,j(t) = β
k∗i (t)
i,j
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∗i (t)∥∥1 ,
where k∗i (t) is an arbitrary maximizer of∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ‖xj(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞
over k = 1, · · · , d. With this rewriting, we have
E(t) ≤M(t)E(t− 1) + C0 max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
≤
(
t∏
r=1
M(r)
)
E(0) + C0 max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
+ C0
t−1∑
m=1
max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥
∑t−m
r=1 wj(r)
t−m
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(
t∏
r=t−m+1
M(r)
)
1.
Note that M(t) is random, and its realization is de-
termined by both the noises in the good agents’ lo-
cal observations and the Byzantine agents’ adversarial
behaviors. Nevertheless, this does not complicate our
analysis because our analysis works for every realization
of M(t). Henceforth, with a little abuse of notation,
we use M(t) to denote both the random matrix and its
realization.
By Lemma 4 and Assumption 2, we know that for
every t, the matrixM(t) is a strict sub-stochastic matrix.
In particular, under the assumptions in Theorem 3, the
following claim is true.
Claim 1. For any t0 and for any sequence of realization
of the matrices M(t) for t = t0 + 1, · · · , t0 + ξφ, the
following holds(
t0+ξφ∏
t=t0+1
M(t)
)
1 ≤ γ1, where γ := 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))ξφ
.
For ease of exposition, the proof of Claim 1 is deferred
to the end of this paper.
With Claim 1, for any fixed t0 and for sufficiently
large t− t0, we have(
t∏
r=t0+1
M(r)
)
1
=
 t∏
r=t0+ξφ+1
M(r)
( t0+ξφ∏
r=t0+1
M(r)
)
1
≤ γ
 t∏
r=t0+ξφ+1
M(r)
 1
≤ γ⌊ t−t0ξφ ⌋
 t∏
r=⌊
t−t0
ξφ
⌋ξφ+1
M(r)
 1
≤ γ⌊ t−t0ξφ ⌋1.
Thus,(
t∏
r=1
M(r)
)
E(0) ≤
(
t∏
r=1
M(r)
)
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞ 1
≤ max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞ γ⌊
t
ξφ
⌋
1.
In addition,
t−1∑
m=0
max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(
t∏
r=t−m+1
M(r)
)
1
≤
t−1∑
m=0
max
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
γ⌊
m
ξφ
⌋
1
≤
t−1∑
m=0
∑
j∈V/A
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
γ⌊
m
ξφ
⌋
1.
For ease of exposition, we assume that ⌊mξφ⌋ is an
integer for any m. Note that this simplification does not
affect the order of convergence.
E(t) ≤
(
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞
)
γ
t
ξφ1
+ C0
∑
j∈V/A
t−1∑
m=0
∥∥∥∥∥ 1t−m
t−m∑
r=1
wj(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
γ
m
ξφ1
≤
(
max
i∈V/A
‖xi(0)− θ∗‖∞
)
γ
t
ξφ1
+ C0
∑
j∈V/A
Rj(γ
1
ξφ , t).
Applying Lemma 2 with λ = γ
1
ξφ , we have
0 ≤ lim
t→∞
E(t) ≤ 0 + 0 + 0 = 0, almost surely.
In addition, by applying Lemma 3 with λ = γ
1
ξφ , we
complete the proof.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1
Recall that M(t) (for each t ≥ 1) is defined as
Mi,j(t) = β
k∗i (t)
i,j
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∗i (t)∥∥1 ,
where k∗i (t) is an arbitrary maximizer of∑
j∈Ni/A
βkij(t)
∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 ‖xj(t− 1)− θ∗‖∞
over k = 1, · · · , d.
For any sequence of realization of the matrices M(t)
for t = t0 + 1, · · · , t0 + ξφ, we construct a sequence
of auxiliary stochastic matrices, denoted by M˜(t), as
follows:
M˜ij(t) := β
k∗i (t)
ij , ∀i, j ∈ V/A.
By Lemma 4, M˜(t) is row-stochastic for t = t0 +
1, · · · , t0 + ξφ. By Definition 1 and Lemma 4, for each
t there exists a reduced graph in H such that
M˜(t) ≥ 1
2 (φ− b)H(t),
where H(t) is the adjacency matrix of the corresponding
reduced graph. For ease of exposition, with a little abuse
of notation, we use H(t) to denote both the adjacency
matrix and the reduced graph. 1 We refer to H(t) as the
shadow graph at time t.
Since the matrix product
∏t0+ξφ
t=t0+1
M(t) consists of
ξφ shadow graphs and |H| = ξ, there exists at least one
reduced graph in H that appears at least φ times in the
sequence of shadow graphs. Let H˜ be one such reduced
graph. Without loss of generality, let i0 be the node in
the unique source component of H˜ such that∣∣∣(Ni0 ∪ {i0}/A) ∩ {j : ∥∥(I−H⊤j Hj) ek∥∥1 < 1}∣∣∣
≥ b+ 1.
Since i0 in the unique source component of H˜ , it follows
that node i0 can reach every other good agents within
φ− 1 hops using the edges in H˜ only.
For any given realization of M(t0 + 1), · · · ,M(t0 +
ξφ), let τ1, · · · , τφ be the first φ time indices at which
H˜ is the shadow graph. In addition, let
∆j := τj − τj−1, ∀ j = 2, · · · , φ.
For ease of exposition, in the reminder of this proof,
we assume t0 = 0. The proof can be easily generalized
to arbitrary t0. Let
η(t) :=
(
t∏
r=1
M(r)
)
1, ∀t.
Note that η(t) ≤ 1 as M(r) is sub-stochastic for all r.
1Its meaning should be clear from the context.
To show Claim 1, it is enough to show the following
three claims.
(A) For any j = 1, · · · , φ,
ηi0(τj) ≤ 1−
1− ρ0
2(φ− b) ;
(B) If i is an outgoing neighbor of i0 in the shadow
graph H˜ , i.e., H˜ii0 = 1, then for any j = 2, · · · , φ,
ηi(τj) ≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))2 .
(C) For any j = 3, · · · , φ, if i0 can reach node i in the
shadow graph H˜ with h hops, where 2 ≤ h ≤ j−1,
then
ηi(τj) ≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))2+
∑j
j′=j+2−h
∆j′
.
Suppose Claims (A), (B), and (C) hold. Recall that i0
is in the unique source component of H˜ . At time τφ, at
all i ∈ V/A, it holds that
ηi(τφ) ≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))2+
∑φ
j′=3
∆j′
≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))ξφ
.
Therefore, we conclude that
η(ξφ) =
 ξφ∏
r=τφ+1
M(r)
 η(τφ)
≤
(
1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))ξφ
) ξφ∏
r=τφ+1
M(r)
 1
≤
(
1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))ξφ
)
1,
proving Claim 1.
In the remainder of the proof, we prove Claims (A),
(B), and (C), individually.
a) We first show (A): For any j = 1, · · · , φ, we
have
η(τj) ≤M(τj)1.
Thus
ηi0(τj) ≤
∑
i∈V/A
Mi0i(τj)
=
∑
i∈V/A
β
k∗i0 (τj)
i0i
∥∥∥(I−H⊤i Hi) ek∗i0(τj)∥∥∥1
≤
∑
i∈V/A &
∥
∥
∥
∥(I−H⊤i Hi)ek∗i0 (τj )
∥
∥
∥
∥
1
<1
β
k∗i0 (τj)
i0i
ρ0
+
∑
i∈V/A &
∥
∥
∥
∥(I−H⊤i Hi)ek∗i0 (τj )
∥
∥
∥
∥
1
=1
β
k∗i0 (τj)
i0i
.
By Lemma 4, Assumption 2, and the choice of i0, we
know that ∑
i∈V/A &
∥
∥
∥
∥(I−H⊤i Hi)ek∗i0 (τj)
∥
∥
∥
∥
1
<1
β
k∗i0 (τj)
i0i
≥ 1
2(|Ni0 ∪ {i0}/A| − b)
≥ 1
2(φ− b) .
Thus, we have
ηi0(τj) ≤ 1−
1− ρ0
2(φ− b) .
b) Next we show (B): For any j = 2, · · · , ν,
η(τj) = M(τj)η(τj − 1) =
∑
i′∈V/A
Mii′(τj)ηi′ (τj − 1).
Recall that
Mii0(τj) = β
k∗i (τj)
ii0
∥∥(I −H⊤i0Hi0) k∗i (τj)∥∥1 .
We consider two cases:
(1)
∥∥(I −H⊤i0Hi0) k∗i (τj)∥∥1 < 1;
(2)
∥∥(I −H⊤i0Hi0) k∗i (τj)∥∥1 = 1.
Suppose that
∥∥(I −H⊤i0Hi0) k∗i (τj)∥∥1 < 1. Since
H˜ii0 = 1, it follows that
M˜ii0(τj) = β
k∗i (τj)
ii0
≥ 1
2(φ− b) .
Thus, we have
ηi(τj) ≤Mii0(τj) +
∑
i′∈V/A&i′=i0
Mii′(τj)
≤ βk∗i (τj)ii0 ρ0 +
∑
i′∈V/A&i′=i0
β
k∗i (τj)
ii′
= 1− βk∗i (τj)ii (1 − ρ0)
≤ 1− 1− ρ0
2(φ− b) .
Suppose that
∥∥(I −H⊤i0Hi0) k∗i (τj)∥∥1 = 1. In this
case
Mii0 (τj) = M˜ii0(τj) ≥
1
2(φ− b) .
Thus, we have
ηi(τj) = Mii0 (τj)ηi0 (τj − 1)
+
∑
i′∈V/A,&i′=i0
Mii′(τj)ηi′ (τj − 1)
≤Mii0 (τj)
(
1− 1− ρ0
2(φ− b)
)
+
∑
i′∈V/A&i′=i0
Mii′(τj)
≤
∑
i′∈V/A
Mi,i′(τj)− 1− ρ0
2(φ− b)Mii0(τj)
≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))2 .
c) Finally we show (C): We prove this by induc-
tion.
Base case: j = 3
Let i be a 2–th order neighbor of node i0 in the shadow
graph H˜ ; there exists a directed path of length 2 such
that i0 → i1 → i in H˜.
If
∥∥(I −H⊤i1Hi1) k∗i (τ3)∥∥1 < 1, similar to the proof
of Claim (B), we have that
ηi(τ3) ≤ 1− 1− ρ0
2(φ− b) .
Now suppose
∥∥(I −H⊤i1Hi1) k∗i (τ3)∥∥1 = 1.
If there exists r where τ2 + 1 ≤ r ≤ τ3 − 1 such that∥∥(I −H⊤i1Hi1) k∗i1 (r)∥∥1 < 1,
i.e., Mi1i1(r) < M˜i1i1(r). Let r
∗ be the latest time
index. Note that βkii(t) ≥ 12(φ−b) for any i ∈ V/A, t
and k. We have
ηi1(r
∗) ≤
∑
i′∈V/A
Mi1i′(r
∗) ≤ 1− 1− ρ0
2(φ− b) .
In addition, by the choice of r∗, we have[
τ3−1∏
r=r∗+1
M(r)
]
i1i1
≥ 1
(2(φ− b))τ3−r∗−1 .
So we get
ηi1(τ3 − 1) =
[
τ3−1∏
r=r∗+1
M(r)
]
i1i1
ηi1(r
∗)
+
∑
i′∈V/A
[
τ3−1∏
r=r∗+1
M(r)
]
i1i′
ηi′ (r
∗)
≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))τ3−r∗ .
As
∥∥(I −H⊤i1Hi1) k∗i (τ3)∥∥1 = 1 and βi∗(τ3)ii0 ≥
1
2(φ−b) , we get that
ηi(τ3) ≤ 1− 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))τ3−r∗+1 ≤ 1−
1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))∆3 .
To finish the proof of the base case, it remains to
consider the case that∥∥(I −H⊤i1Hi1) k∗i1(r)∥∥1 = 1,
i.e., Mi1i1(r) = M˜i1i1(r) for all r such that τ2 + 1 ≤
r ≤ τ3 − 1. Thus, we get[
τ3−1∏
r=τ2+1
M(r)
]
i1i1
≥ 1
(2(φ− b))∆3−1 .
So
ηi1 (τ3 − 1) =
∑
i′∈V/A
[
τ3−1∏
r=τ2+1
M(r)
]
i1,i′
ηi′(τ2)
≤ 1−
[
τ3−1∏
r=τ2+1
M(r)
]
i1,i1
1
(2(φ− b))2
≤ 1− 1
(2(φ− b))∆3+1
,
and
ηi(τ3) ≤ 1− 1
(2(φ− b))∆3+2
.
Induction step: Suppose the following holds for any
j = 3, · · · , φ− 1:
ηi(τj) ≤ 1− ρ0
(2(φ− b))2+
∑j
j′=j+2−h
∆j′
for all the h–th order neighbor of node i0 in the shadow
graph H˜ , where h = 2, · · · , j − 1.
Inductive step:
The proof of the inductive step is similar to the proof
of the base case, thus is omitted.
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